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PROTECTION OF CHILD WITNESSES AND
THE RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION: A
BALANCING OF INTERESTS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Alaska has joined the growing number of states' seeking to pro-
tect child witnesses from the trauma often associated with testifying in
court. The Alaska statute2 provides alternative procedures by which
the child may testify in certain criminal proceedings. The Alaska stat-
ute is designed in part to shield the child from the defendant, whose
presence may intimidate the child and render the child unable to com-
municate. In so doing, however, the statute may compromise the con-
stitutional right of the criminal defendant to physically confront his
accuser.
3
This note will consider the impact of the Alaska statute on the
defendant's sixth amendment right of confrontation. It will analyze
the United States Supreme Court decision in Coy v. Iowa,4 the Court's
sole pronouncement on this issue. It will suggest that in light of Coy
and the states' response to Coy, the Alaska statute will survive consti-
tutional challenge. This note will propose contours for the construc-
tion of the Alaska statute which will best safeguard it from
constitutional attack. For purposes of illustration, this note will
briefly examine an application of child-protective procedures in
Alaska pre-dating enactment of the Alaska statute in a case now pend-
ing on appeal. 5 Finally, this note will examine the issues the United
States Supreme Court will consider in Maryland v. Craig, 6 the Court's
first encounter with a statute similar to Alaska's.
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1. Approximately 26 states, including Alaska, have provided for the use of
closed circuit television or one-way obstructions to the view of child witnesses. Ap-
proximately 34 states have provided for the use of videotaped testimony of child wit-
nesses. See infra notes 65-66.
2. ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.046 (Supp. 1989).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
4. - U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988).
5. State v. Blume (Alaska Super.) (Nos. 3ANS-86-2547 Cr., 3ANS-86-1847 Cr.),
appeal docketed, Nos. A-1799, A-1902 (Alaska Ct. App. Sept. 19, 1989).
6. Craig v. State, 316 Md. 551, 560 A.2d 1120 (1989), cert. granted sub nom.
Maryland v. Craig, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 834 (Jan. 16, 1990).
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II. THE ALASKA STATUTE
In 1988, Alaska enacted a child witness protection statute
designed to minimize the trauma experienced by children who testify
in certain criminal proceedings. In providing alternative procedures
for eliciting the testimony of child witnesses, the Alaska legislature has
sought:
(1) to balance the need for the victim's or witness's testimony
against the right of the defendant to confront witnesses;
(2) to mitigate the mental and emotional distress that may arise as
the child is required to testify; and
(3) to minimize possible victim harrassment by limiting the oppor-
tunities for unnecessary examination of the child by the parties'
counsel.
7
The statute empowers a court to permit children under the age of
thirteen to testify either by closed circuit television or from behind
one-way mirrors. The court must first determine, however, that the
child witness would be unable to communicate effectively if required
to testify under traditional courtroom procedures. 8 The statute identi-
fies certain factors the court should consider in deciding whether the
case warrants the use of these measures, specifically:
(1) the child's chronological age;
(2) the child's level of development;
(3) the child's general physical health;
(4) any physical, emotional, or psychological injury experienced
by the child; and
(5) the mental or emotional strain that will be caused by requiring
the child to testify under normal courtroom procedures. 9
When the child testifies outside the courtroom by means of closed
circuit television, those entitled to be present, in addition to the opera-
tors of the television equipment, are the prosecuting attorney, the de-
fendant's attorney and other persons whose presence the court believes
will contribute to the child's well-being.' 0 The defendant, the court
and the jury contemporaneously view the child from the courtoom. I
Upon request of the defendant, the court shall excuse the defendant
from the courtroom and allow the defendant to observe the televised
testimony from another location.' 2
The court shall allow the defendant to communicate with his at-
torney throughout the proceeding. 13 While only the court and counsel
7. 1988 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 92, § 1.
8. ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.046(a)(2) (Supp. 1989).
9. Id. § 12.45.046(b)(1)-(5).
10. Id. § 12.45.046(c)(l)-(2).
11. Id. § 12.45.046(c).
12. Id. § 12.45.046(d).
13. Id.
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may question the child, the defendant or his attorney may request a
recess to confer. The court shall provide a procedure by which it may
communicate with the attorneys as the child is questioned. It may
consider objections to questions from the courtroom if necessary.14
When the child is permitted to testify from behind a one-way mir-
ror, the child will see the attorneys as he or she is questioned by them,
but the mirror shall be placed so that the child cannot see the defend-
ant or the jurors. 15 These measures thus shield the child from the gaze
of the defendant, yet allow the defendant to consult with his attorney
as the child is questioned.16
III. THE SUPREME COURT IN CoY v IOWA
The United States Supreme Court invalidated an Iowa child wit-
ness protection statute in its 1988 landmark decision in Coy v. Iowa. 17
The Court held that the placement of a screen between two child wit-
nesses and the defendant violated ,the defendant's sixth amendment
right of confrontation. The Court therefore struck down the Iowa
statute. 18
The defendant in Coy was charged with sexually assaulting two
thirteen-year-old girls. At trial the state moved to allow the girls to
testify behind a screen or via closed circuit television pursuant to a
recently enacted Iowa statute. The trial court permitted a screen to be
placed between the defendant and the witness stand during the girls'
testimony. The lighting was adjusted to allow the defendant to dimly
perceive the girls but to prevent the girls from seeing the defendant.' 9
The defendant objected to the use of the screen on confrontation
grounds, alleging that, though it might ease the tensions of the girls as
they testified, it violated his sixth amendment right to confront his
accusers. 20 He also objected to the use of the screen on due process
14. Id.
15. Id. § 12.45.046(e).
16. The statute also provides that, where the court does not find that the child
would be unable to communicate effectively under normal court procedures, the court
may nonetheless control the spatial arrangements of the courtroom and the location,
movement and deportment of those present in order to minimize emotional harm or
stress to the child. The court may also permit the child to testify while sitting on the
floor or in a suitably sized chair. It may schedule the procedure in a room that pro-
vides privacy, freedom from distractions, informality and comfort appropriate to the
child's developmental age, and order a recess when the child's energy, comfort or
attention span warrants it. Id. § 12.45.046(f)(l)-(3). The statute also provides that
the court may appoint a guardian ad litem. Id. § 12.45.046(a)(1).
17. - U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988).
18. Id. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2803.
19. Id. at-, 108 S. Ct. at 2799.
20. Id.
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grounds, alleging that its placement next to him would make him ap-
pear guilty and erode his presumption of innocence. 21 The trial court
rejected these claims, but instructed the jury not to consider the use of
the screen in its consideration of guilt or innocence.22
The defendant was convicted on two counts of engaging in lasciv-
ious acts with a child. On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed
his convictions. The court rejected the defendant's confrontation
claim on the ground that the screen did not impair the defendant's
ability to cross-examine the girls. The court also dismissed the defend-
ant's due process claim, ruling that the placement of the screen be-
tween the girls and the defendant did not inherently prejudice the
defendant. 23
The United States Supreme Court, finding it unnecessary to reach
the defendant's due process claim, held that use of the screen violated
the defendant's right of confrontation. It therefore reversed the judg-
ment of the Iowa Supreme Court and remanded the case for the state
court to determine whether the error was harmless beyond a reason-
able doubt.2 4
Justice Scalia wrote the opinion for the majority. 25 He placed
very strong emphasis on the need of the criminal defendant "to be
confronted with the witnesses against him," as guaranteed by the sixth
amendment. 26 He sought to convey in his opinion that "there is some-
thing deep in human nature that regards face-to-face confrontation be-
tween accused and accuser as 'essential to a fair trial in a criminal
prosecution.' "27
Justice Scalia saw the right of face-to-face confrontation as im-
portant because he believed it served to "'ensur[e] the integrity of the
fact-finding process.' "28 He emphasized repeatedly the belief that it is
far more difficult to tell a lie, or to tell a lie convincingly, when con-
fronted by the accused. 29 The balance he struck was in favor of the
21. Id.
22. Id. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2799-2800.
23. Id. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2800.
24. Id. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2803.
25. Justice Scalia's opinion was ostensibly joined by five Justices, though Justice
O'Connor, joined by Justice White, wrote separately to qualify their support for his
opinion. Justice Blackmun and Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented, while Justice Ken-
nedy took no part in the decision.
26. - U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. at 2800 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI).
27. Id. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2801 (quoting Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404
(1965)). In support of this proposition, Justice Scalia made reference to passages from
Shakespeare, the Bible and the Code of Abilene, Kansas. Id. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2800-
02.
28. Id. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2802 (quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 736
(1987)).
29. Id.
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defendant: "That face-to-face presence may, unfortunately, upset the
truthful rape victim or abused child; but by the same token it may
confound and undo the false accuser, or reveal the child coached by a
malevolent adult. It is a truism that constitutional protections have
costs." 30
Justice Scalia distinguished what he believed to be the core right
of the confrontation clause, the right to face-to-face confrontation at
trial, from those rights the Court has construed as reasonably implicit
within the right of confrontation, such as the right to cross-examine
witnesses and the right to exclude out-of-court statements. He argued
that this core right to face-to-face confrontation at trial reflects "the
irreducible literal meaning of the clause," and therefore is not subject
to the several exceptions that the Court has identified where the right
of confrontation encounters important competing interests.31 He de-
clined to speculate whether there could be exceptions to this core right
of confrontation, but insisted that any such exception would have to
be "necessary to further an important public policy."'32
Justice Scalia found that the Iowa statute failed to satisfy the re-
quirement of necessity.33 He therefore did not consider whether the
protection of child witnesses was an important public policy sufficient
to create an exception to the defendant's right of confrontation. The
Iowa statute, unlike the Alaska statute, did not require a trial court to
make a case-specific showing that the use of a screen was necessary to
protect the child from trauma or to enable the child to testify.34 In-
stead, the statute simply created a legislative presumption that trauma
would result. 35 Justice Scalia wrote: "Our cases suggest, however,
that even as to exceptions from the normal implications of the Con-
frontation Clause, as opposed to its most literal application, something
more than the type of generalized finding underlying such a statute is
needed when the exception is not 'firmly ... rooted in our jurispru-
dence.' ",36 The judgment therefore "could not be sustained by any
conceivable exception." 37
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice White, wrote separately. Jus-
tice O'Connor expressed support for Justice Scalia's opinion insofar as
it did not conflict with the view that, while the defendant's right of
confrontation was violated in this case, there exist appropriate circum-
stances in which that right may yield to other competing interests so
30. Id. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2802.
31. Id. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2802-03.
32. Id. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2803.
33. Id.
34. Id. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.046(a)(2) (Supp. 1989).
35. Coy, - U.S. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2803.
36. Id. (quoting Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987)).
37. Id. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2803.
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as to allow the selective use of alternative procedures to protect the
child witness from the trauma of courtroom testimony.38
Justice O'Connor emphasized that the Court has consistently in-
dicated that the confrontation clause reflects merely a preference for
face-to-face confrontation at trial, which may be overcome by careful
analysis of competing interests.39 She rejected Justice Scalia's sugges-
tion that this principle might be less true where an exception impli-
cates the core right of confrontation, noting that use of hearsay
evidence often compromises this core right, but is nonetheless ex-
cepted from the purview of the confrontation clause.40
Justice O'Connor agreed with Justice Scalia that an exception to
the right of confrontation must be necessary to further an important
public policy. 41 She went further, however, and explicitly identified
the protection of child witnesses as an important public policy war-
ranting an exception to the right of confrontation. She stated that the
Court's inquiry should therefore center on the requirement of neces-
sity.42 While she agreed that the Iowa scheme did not satisfy the ne-
cessity requirement, she indicated that a statutory scheme requiring
specific findings of necessity might cause the "compelling state inter-
est" of protecting child witnesses to outweigh the defendant's interest
in confronting his accuser.43
Justice Blackmun, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissented,
believing that the Iowa procedure did not offend the confrontation
clause.44 The dissent agreed with the concurrence that the confronta-
tion clause reflects only a preference for face-to-face confrontation,
best exemplified by the frequent admission of certain hearsay state-
ments, such as co-conspirator statements, made outside the presence
of the defendant. The dissent, unpersuaded by Justice Scalia's concep-
tion of face-to-face confrontation at trial as the "irreducible literal
meaning of the clause," argued that the extent of infringement was
minimal where the right of cross-examination was not compromised. 45
The two dissenting Justices, like the two concurring Justices, ex-
plicitly identified the protection of child witnesses as an important
38. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
39. Id. at -- , 108 S. Ct. at 2804 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Ohio v. Rob-
erts, 448 U.S. 56, 63-64 (1980)).
40. Id. at -- , 108 S. Ct. at 2804-05 (O'Connor, J., concurring). As Justice
O'Connor stated, "[tihat a particular procedure impacts the 'irreducible literal mean-
ing of the clause,' . . . does not alter this conclusion." Id. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2804
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting id. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2803 (Scalia, J.)).
41. Id. at -- , 108 S. Ct. at 2805 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at -- , 108 S. Ct. at 2806-07 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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public policy to which the defendant's interest in face-to-face confron-
tation might bow. 46 The dissent identified two major adverse conse-
quences of face-to-face confrontation between defendant and child
witness: the encounter may cause psychological and emotional injury
to the child; and the encounter may so frighten the child as to render
the child witness unable to testify, causing the loss of truthful testi-
mony and seriously compromising the truth-determining process.47
Unlike the other six Justices who participated in the decision,
however, the dissenters argued that a legislative exception to the right
of confrontation, as found under the Iowa statute, was similar to other
rules allowing general admissibility of out-of-court statements, and
therefore did not offend the confrontation clause.48 The dissent ar-
gued that because the girls had testified under oath, in view of the trier
of fact, and subject to cross-examination, their statements possessed
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness warranting their admis-
sion without more.49
The Court therefore requires that an exception to the defendant's
right to face-to-face confrontation be at a minimum "necessary to fur-
ther an important public policy." The four Justices adhering to the
opinion of Justice Scalia would require that this showing be made
before they could even consider whether there exists an exception to
the core right of confrontation. The two concurring Justices would
require nothing more, explicitly stating that the protection of child
witnesses is an important public policy and suggesting that the neces-
sity requirement could be satisfied by case-specific findings. The two
dissenting Justices would require an even lesser showing, which by im-
plication would be satisfied by an individualized showing of necessity.
The dissent, like the concurrence, explicitly identified the protection of
child witnesses as an important public policy, bringing the number of
Justices to do so to four.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ALASKA STATUTE
A majority of the Court in Coy did not specifically address the
constitutionality of child witness protection statutes which provide for
case-specific findings of necessity. While not directly at issue in Coy,
the two concurring Justices embraced such a procedure. The two dis-
senting Justices would by implication also endorse this statutory
scheme. The fact that the four remaining Justices who participated in
Coy strongly criticized the dissent but not the concurrence suggests a
46. Id. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2809 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
1990]
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lack of substantial disagreement with the concurrence as to the per-
missibility of a procedure providing for individualized findings of ne-
cessity. These four Justices, while they might require a greater
showing of necessity than that required by the concurring Justices,
will therefore likely allow protective procedures when narrowly tai-
lored to a specific case.
A. Interests Advanced by Protective Statutes
Child witness protection statutes advance at least two important
public policies which under certain circumstances should suffice to
override the defendant's right of face-to-face confrontation: reducing
the trauma child witnesses may suffer as they testify in the presence of
the defendant; and providing an atmosphere in which child witnesses
may communicate effectively to the jury.
The first policy, the primary impetus for these procedural innova-
tions, involves protection of child witnesses from the psychological
harm they may experience if required to testify in court. As the dis-
sent noted in Coy, "[a]lthough research in this area is still in its early
stages, studies of children who have testified in court indicate that
such testimony is 'associated with increased behavioral disturbance in
children.'-5o A number of commentators have questioned the sys-
tem's role in subjecting child witnesses to the potential trauma associ-
ated with courtroom testimony.-"
The second policy implicates a frequent consequence of this
trauma: the loss of the child's testimony. Confrontation between the
defendant and the child witness may so frighten the child as to render
the witness unable to testify. As the dissent noted in Coy, " 'to a child
who does not understand the reason for confrontation, the anticipa-
tion and experience of being in close proximity to the defendant can be
50. Coy, -- U.S. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2808 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting G.
Goodman, D. Jones, E. Pyle, L. Prado-Estrada, L. Port, P. England, R. Mason & L.
Rudy, The Emotional Effects of Criminal Court Testimony on Child Sexual Assault
Victims, in THE BRITISH PSYCHOLOGICAL SOCIETY FOR THE DIVISION OF CRIMINO-
LOGICAL AND LEGAL PSYCHOLOGY, THE CHILD WITNESS: DO THE COURTS ABUSE
CHILDREN? 52 (1988)).
51. See generally Avery, The Child Abuse Witness: Potential for Secondary Vic-
timization, 7 CRIM. JUST. J. 1, 3-4 (1983); Mahady-Smith, The Young Victim as Wit-
ness for the Prosecution: Another Form of Abuse?, 89 DICK. L. REV. 721 (1985);
Melton, The Child Witness and the First Amendment: A Psychological Dilemma, 40 J.
Soc. ISSUES 109 (1984); Myers, The Legal Response to Child Abuse: In the Best Inter-
ests of Children? 24 J. FAM. L. 149 (1985-86); Parker, The Rights of Child Witnesses:
Is the Court a Protector or Perpetrator?, 17 NEw ENG. L. REV. 643 (1981-82).
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overwhelming.' "52 Providing a procedure by which the child may tes-
tify effectively may "ensur[e] the integrity of the fact-finding pro-
cess,"'5 3 a central theme of Justice Scalia's opinion, by making possible
truthful testimony that might otherwise be lost through intentional or
inadvertent intimidation of the child witness.
The adverse impact of the loss of such testimony may be espe-
cially severe in the prosecution of child abuse cases, the offense for
which the protective statutes were primarily designed. One difficulty
in the prosecution of these cases is that the child is often the only
witness to the abuse, and yet it is often very difficult for the child to
relate the relevant events. This difficulty may stem from either the
child's low cognitive development or the child's lack of understanding
of the judicial process. The ability of the defendant, frequently a rela-
tive of the child, to "stare down" the child may have a debilitating
impact on the child's ability to communicate effectively. This problem
is accentuated by the fact that the child is called to testify in a foreign
and often confusing environment.5 4 The child's testimony, often cru-
cial to the prosecution, may therefore be lost.
Society has a substantial interest in effective prosecution of these
cases. Statistics reveal that reports of the mistreatment of children are
steadily increasing. Annual reports of mistreatment increased from
669,000 cases in 1976 to over 2.4 million cases in 1989.55 The number
of child abuse fatalities continues to rise, increasing more than thirty-
eight percent since 1985, with a minimum of three child deaths per
day attributed to child abuse. 56
The figures for Alaska are equally grim. The State of Alaska,
Department of Health and Social Services, Division of Family and
52. - U.S. at-, 108 S. Ct. at 2808 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting D. WHIT-
COMB, E. SHAPIRO & L. STELLWAGEN, WHEN THE VICTIM IS A CHILD: ISSUES FOR
JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS 17-18 (1985)).
53. - U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. at 2802 (quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. at 736).
54. Note, however, that the intimidation or fear created by the courtroom itself
may be cured by remedies which do not compromise the defendant's right of confron-
tation, such as reducing the degree of courtroom formality or allowing the child to sit
in an appropriately sized chair. The Alaska statute confers significant discretion on
the trial court to adjust courtroom procedures in a number of ways which do not
affect the defendant's right of confrontation. See supra note 16.
55. THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR PROTECTING CHILDREN, HIGHLIGHTS
OF OFFICIAL CHILD NEGLECT AND ABUSE REPORTING, 1985 at 3 (1987); NATIONAL
COMMITTEE FOR PREVENTION OF CHILD ABUSE, CURRENT TRENDS IN CHILD
ABUSE AND REPORTING AND FATALITIES: THE RESULTS OF THE 1989 ANNUAL
FIFTY STATE SURVEY 2 (1990).
56. Based on data collected from forty-one states and the District of Columbia.
NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR PREVENTION OF CHILD ABUSE, supra note 55, at 15.
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Youth Services (DFYS), provided protective services for 2,866 chil-
dren in fiscal year 1978. 57 It provided protective services for 9,744
children just ten years later. In fiscal year 1978, DFYS reported that
506 of these children had been physically abused. It reported that
2,423 children had been physically abused in fiscal year 1988.58 This
increase in the reported incidence of physical abuse and neglect of
children in Alaska has not seen a corresponding increase in social
workers to combat this societal tragedy. 59
Prosecution of these cases has not kept pace with their increasing
incidence. The National Institute of Justice, for instance, has sug-
gested that over ninety percent of all child abuse cases are not brought
forward.60 Child witness protection statutes seek to increase the likeli-
hood of effective prosecution of child abuse and other criminal prose-
cutions by providing alternatives to traditional courtroom procedures
where the court has determined that the child witness is unable to
communicate. By making facts known that would otherwise be lost,
these procedures enhance the truth-determining process. The concern
for ensuring accurate fact finding led Justice Scalia to place great im-
portance on the right to face-to-face confrontation. 61 That concern
may in many instances be better served by denying the defendant the
right to such confrontation where the witness is a child.
The benefit of face-to-face confrontation is the ability of a defend-
ant to stare down the lying witness. The cost associated with this ben-
efit, in addition to the trauma inflicted upon the child, is the possibility
that truthful testimony will be lost through intimidation by the de-
fendant. Any cost-benefit comparison must consider that the balance
is struck heavily in favor of the defendant in a criminal trial. Constitu-
tional safeguards do in fact, as Justice Scalia notes, 62 have their costs.
As a practical matter, however, there comes a point at which the cost
of the constitutional protection so outweighs its marginal benefit that
the right may be compromised. Such a situation exists where a court
has made a showing that the infringement, the denial of face-to-face
confrontation, is necessary to protect the child and to allow the child
57. See STATE OF ALASKA, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES,
DIVISION OF FAMILY AND YOUTH SERVICES, CHILDREN RECEIVING PROTECTIVE
SERVICES (1989).
58. Id.
59. See Hai-per, Abuse Case Handling Censured, Anchorage Times, Apr. 20,
1989, at A-1, A-8, col. 6.
60. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, RESEARCH IN BRIEF 1 (Nov. 1985).
61. See State v. Bonello, 210 Conn. 51, 60, 554 A.2d 277, 282 (1989) ("[T]he
priority accorded the right to face-to-face confrontation in Coy turned not on its in-
trinsic inviolability but rather on its functional value in enhancing the factfinding pro-
cess of criminal trials .... ").
62. Coy, - U.S. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2802.
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to testify effectively, and does not substantially disadvantage the de-
fendant, who is protected by other constitutional safeguards emanat-
ing from the confrontation clause. These safeguards include the
requirement that the witness testify under oath, subject to cross-exam-
ination, and in the presence of the trier of fact, who may judge the
demeanor of the witness as he or she testifies. 63 A court engages in
this balancing process, and reaches a similar result, when it admits
hearsay statements against the defendant, compromising the defend-
ant's right to face-to-face confrontation in favor of society's interest in
effective prosecution. Though Justice Scalia's opinion does not explic-
itly suggest it, all members of the Court in Coy engaged in some form
of balancing.
The need for the child to testify effectively is often substantial. It
may be particularly important in the case of child abuse, where the
child witness is often the only source of direct evidence of that abuse.
At the same time, however, the importance of this testimony also re-
quires that the defendant's right to face-to-face confrontation not be
compromised where protective procedures are not essential. The bal-
ance is a delicate one, but certainly one that may favor the child under
appropriate circumstances. The balance should be struck in favor of
the child where a court has made an individualized showing that pro-
tective procedures are necessary to safeguard the child from psycho-
logical injury and to enable the child witness to communicate
effectively, and that the danger of false child testimony is addressed by
other constitutional safeguards emanating from the confrontation
clause, such as the right of cross-examination.
B. The States' Response to Coy
Despite the Court's invalidation of the Iowa statute in Coy, the
importance of the public policies served by these statutes makes it al-
most certain that the Court will strike a balance in favor of protective
procedures where statutes mandate individualized showings of neces-
sity. This conclusion is borne out by the legislative and judical re-
sponse to Coy, which has been overwhelmingly supportive of such
procedures, even where the defendant's right of confrontation is
compromised. 64
63. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970).
64. Note that a few state statutes, by their language or by judicial construction, do
not implicate confrontation issues because they allow the defendant to be present with
the child when the protective procedures are employed. These statutes do, however,
shield the child from the courtroom, the jury or both. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-25-3
(Supp. 1989) (allowing the use of closed circuit television but providing that the de-
fendant be present in the same room as the child witness); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
1990]
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A majority of states have enacted, or have retained, child witness
protection statutes which, like Alaska's, shield the child from confron-
tation with the defendant. At least one-half of the states, in addition
to Alaska, permit by statute the use of closed circuit television or one-
way obstructions to the line of sight of the child witness. 65 A majority
of states also permit the use of videotaped testimony utilizing proce-
dural safeguards similar to those found with the use of closed circuit
television. 66 These states have thus clearly evinced their belief that
para. 106-A2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 65.00-.30 (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1990) (providing for two-way closed circuit television). See also Com-
monwealth v. Bergstrom, 402 Mass. 534, 524 N.E.2d 366 (1988) (holding that the
confrontation clause of the Massachusetts Constitution requires that the defendant be
present when videotaped testimony of the child is taken, despite no such requirement
under the statute itself, MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 278, § 16D (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989)).
65. As of February 1990, at least 26 states provide for the use of closed circuit
television, one-way screens or one-way mirrors. ALA. CODE § 15-25-3 (Supp. 1989);
ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.046 (Supp. 1989); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-4253 (1989);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347 (West Supp. 1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86g
(West Supp. 1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.54 (West Supp. 1990); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 17-8-55 (Supp. 1989); HAW. R. EvID. 616 (1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-8
(Bums Supp. 1989); IOWA CODE ANN. § 910A.14 (West Supp. 1989); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 22-3434. (1988); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.350 (Baldwin Supp. 1989); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:283 (West Supp. 1990); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 9-102 (1989); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 278, § 16D (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 595.02 subd. 4 (West 1988); Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-405 (Supp.
1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32.4 (West Supp. 1989); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§§ 65.00-.30 (McKinney Supp. 1990); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.41 (Anderson
1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 753 (West Supp. 1990); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit.
42 § 5985 (Purdon Supp. 1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13.1 (Supp. 1988); TEX.
CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 38.071 (Vernon Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-
35-15.5 (Supp. 1989); VT. R. EvID. 807(e), (f) (Supp. 1989).
66. As of February 1990, 34 states provide for the use of videotaped testimony.
ALA. CODE § 15-25-2 (Supp. 1989); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4253 (1989); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 16-44-203 (1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1346 (West Supp. 1990); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 18-3-413 (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86g (West Supp. 1989);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3511 (1987); FLA. STAT. § 92.53 (West Supp. 1990);
HAW. R. EvID. 616 (1988); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 106A-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1989); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-8 (Burns Supp. 1989); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 910A.14 (West Supp. 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3434 (1988); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 421.350 (Baldwin Supp. 1990); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278 § 16D (West
Supp. 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (West Supp. 1988); Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-
1-407 (Supp. 1989); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 491.680-687 (Vernon Supp. 1989); MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ ,6-15-401 to -403 (1987); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 174.227, 174.229
(1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 517.13-a (Supp. 1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-17
(1984); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.41 (Baldwin 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22
§ 753 (West Supp. 1990); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 42 § 5984 (Purdon Supp. 1989);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13.1 (Supp. 1988); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1530(G) (1985);
S.D. CODE ANN. § 23A-12-9 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-7-116 (Supp. 1989);
TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 38.071 (Vernon Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 77-35-15.5 (Supp. 1989); VT. R. EVID. 807; Wis. STAT. § 967.04(7) (Supp. 1989);
Wyo. STAT. § 7-11-408 (1987).
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these procedures are necessary and that they further important public
policies.
Since the Court's decision in Coy, state courts have almost unani-
mously upheld the constitutionality of their statutes, despite interfer-
ence with the defendant's right to face-to-face confrontation, where
individualized showings of necessity are required either by statute or
judicial decision. 67 One court has invalidated its state statute, and de-
clined to reform that statute, where case-specific findings of necessity
were not mandated. 68 The Louisiana Supreme Court likened the re-
quirements of its state statute to the general legislative findings made
by the Iowa statute considered in Coy, but refused to speculate as to
the constitutionality of the Louisiana statute if specific, individualized
findings were made.69 The courts in only two states which have ad-
dressed the issue have declined to permit exceptions in this context to
the defendant's right of face-to-face confrontation. 70
The facial constitutionality of the Alaska statute, which provides
for case-specific findings of necessity, thus appears free from doubt,
despite the fact that the United States Supreme Court has not yet up-
held such a statute.
67. E.g., State v. Vincent, 159 Ariz. 418, 768 P.2d 150 (1989) (en banc); People v.
Thomas, 770 P.2d 1324 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988), cert. granted (Colo. Mar. 13, 1989);
State v. Bonello, 210 Conn. 51, 554 A.2d 277, cert. denied, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 2103
(1989); Glendening v. State, 536 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 109 S.
Ct. 3219 (1989); Brady v. State, 540 N.E.2d 59 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989); State v. Hover-
sten, 437 N.W.2d 240 (Iowa 1989), cert. denied, - U.S. - 110 S. Ct. 212 (1989);
State v. Eaton, 244 Kan. 370, 769 P.2d 1157 (1989); Wildermuth v. State, 310 Md.
496, 530 A.2d 275 (1987); State v. Conklin, 444 N.W.2d 268 (Minn. 1989); State v.
Crandall, 231 N.J. Super. 124, 555 A.2d 35 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989), cert. granted,
117 N.J. 143, 564 A.2d 866 (1989); State v. Tafoya, 108 N.M. 1, 765 P.2d 1183 (Ct.
App. 1988), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 1572 (1989); People v. Rivera, 141
Misc. 2d 1031, 535 N.Y.S.2d 909 (Sup. Ct. 1988); Ohio v. Eastham, 39 Ohio St. 3d
307, 530 N.E.2d 409 (1988); Commonwealth v. Groff, 548 A.2d 1237 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1988); State v. Taylor, 562 A.2d 445 (R.I. 1989); State v. Thomas, 150 Wis. 2d 374,
442 N.W.2d 10, cert. denied, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 188 (1989).
68. State v. Murphy, 542 So. 2d 1373, 1376 (La. 1989).
69. Id.
70. Commonwealth v. Bergstrom, 402 Mass. 534, 550-51, 524 N.E.2d 366, 374-75
(1988) (basing its holding solely on the right of confrontation contained within the
Massachusetts Constitution); State v. Murray, 375 S.E.2d 405, 412 (W. Va. 1988)
(declining to engage in extensive analysis). In People v. Bastien, the Illinois Supreme
Court held that its child shield statute violated the defendant's right of confrontation,
but only insofar as it denied his right to contemporaneous cross-examination during
videotaping. 129 Ill. 2d 64, -, 541 N.E.2d 670, 676 (1989). The court explicitly
declined to address the right of face-to-face confrontation. Id. at -, 541 N.E.2d at
674.
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V. CONTOURS OF THE ALASKA STATUTE
The battleground in the state courts has moved from the general
constitutionality of protective statutes, which is now presumed, to the
constitutionally permissible contours of these statutes. The statutes
vary significantly in the reach of their provisions, and courts, as Jus-
tice O'Connor predicted in Coy, 71 have varied in their interpretation of
the degree of necessity that is required before the defendant's right of
confrontation may be compromised.
A. Coverage of the Statute
Alaska's statute may be used to protect child witnesses who were
not themselves the victims of a crime.72 While many statutes protect
only child victims, a number of statutes extend as far as the Alaska
statute to reach non-victim child witnesses. 73 The broad scope of stat-
utes like Alaska's may be subject to constitutional challenge under the
Court's requirement of necessity, which has yet to be defined.
The Court may find that a child witness who was not a victim
could never meet the requirement of necessity. The more appropriate
resolution of this issue, however, would be to adopt a flexible standard
of necessity, one that considers whether the child witness was a victim
as a factor in determining whether the procedures are necessary in a
given case. It seems likely that the statutory threshold, whether a
showing of trauma sufficient to inflict lasting psychological injury or a
showing sufficient to render the child unable to communicate, will
often be more difficult to meet where the child was merely a witness to
a criminal offense. It would be inappropriate, however, to categori-
cally deny such a child the protection of the statute. A court could
conceivably find that under certain circumstances the requirement of
necessity is met notwithstanding the fact that the child was not a
victim.
In State v. Blume, 74 Judge White of the Superior Court of Alaska,
Third Judicial District, shielded a child witness from the gaze of her
parents, the defendants, despite the fact that the child was not a victim
to the alleged abuse. The judge permitted the child, the sister of the
victim, to testify while her parents watched from behind a one-way
71. Coy, -- U.S. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2805 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
72. ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.046 (Supp. 1989).
73. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4251 (1989); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11
§ 3511 (1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-8(d) (Bums Supp. 1989); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 910 A. 14 (West Supp. 1989); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 278 § 16D (Law. Co-op.
1989).
74. State v. Blume (Alaska Super.) (Nos. 3ANS-86-2547 Cr., 3ANS-86-1847 Cr.),
appeal docketed, Nos. A-1799, A-1902 (Alaska Ct. App. Sept. 19, 1989).
[Vol. 7:223
CHILD WITNESS PROTECTION
mirror. 75 The judge ordered that the child witness be subject to full
cross-examination, that the defendants be in full communication with
their counsel and that the defendants be entitled to a limiting instruc-
tion concerning the child's testimony.76 There is some question as to
the sufficiency of the trial court showing that protective procedures
were warranted in Blume, which was made without benefit of the
Alaska statute or the Supreme Court's decision in Coy. Nonetheless,
the fact pattern in Blume, in which the child was to testify against her
parents, and there had been evidence that her parents had instructed
her not to testify,77 presents a compelling case for the appropriateness
of protecting certain non-victim witnesses.
B. Substantive Standard
The substantive standard for invoking child witness protection
varies substantially by state. At least six state statutes require a find-
ing of some degree of "serious" or "severe" psychological or emotional
distress. 78 Other statutes require a lesser showing.79 Courts generally
require that the child experience "much more than mere nervousness
or excitement or some reluctance to testify."80
The Alaska statute and others like it analyze the trauma that tes-
tifying is likely to inflict by examining the ability of the child to com-
municate in the proceeding.8' The Alaska statute, which treats the
likelihood of psychological harm to the child as a factor82 but ulti-
mately focuses on the child's inability to communicate effectively
75. Id., transcript at 271-78.
76. Id., at 277-78.
77. Id., at 277.
78. See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-55 (Supp. 1989); MD. CTs. & JUD. PROC. CODE
ANN. § 9-102(a) (1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32.4 (West Supp. 1989); N.Y.
CRIM. PROc. LAW § 65.10 (McKinney Supp. 1990); OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2907.41 (Anderson 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-15.5 (Supp. 1989).
79. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.53 (Vest Supp. 1989) ("substantial likelihood...
[of] moderate emotional or mental harm if required to testify in open court"); IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-8(d) (Bums Supp. 1989); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.680(2)
(Vernon Supp. 1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 517:13-a (Supp. 1989); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 967.04(7)(a) (West Supp. 1988).
80. E.g., Wildermuth v. State, 310 Md. 496, 524, 530 A.2d 275, 289 (1987); ac-
cord State v. Vincent, 159 Ariz. 418, 431, 768 P.2d 150, 163 (1989); State v. Eaton,
244 Kan. 370,-, 769 P.2d 1157, 1165 (1989); State v. Conklin, 444 N.W.2d 268, 274
(Minn. 1989).
81. ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.046(a) (Supp. 1989); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE
ANN. § 9-102(a)(1)(ii) (1989) ("testimony by the child victim in the courtroom will
result in the child suffering serious emotional distress such that the child cannot rea-
sonably communicate"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.41(B)(1)(a) (Anderson 1987).
See also VT. R. EvID. 807(c) (Supp. 1989).
82. ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.046(b) (Supp. 1989).
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under normal courtroom procedures, 83 most directly addresses the re-
quirement of necessity imposed by the Court in Coy. It is therefore the
type of statute most likely to survive constitutional challenge.
Some courts have further required that the trauma inflicted upon
the child, or the child's inability to testify, be the result of the presence
of the defendant and not the fear created simply by the size or unfa-
miliarity of the courtroom. 84 Where the trauma is the product of ex-
posure to the courtroom and not to the defendant, a trial court should
utilize remedies less invasive of the defendant's right of confrontation,
such as adjustments to the courtroom setting or to courtroom proce-
dure. This approach embodies the Supreme Court's requirement of
necessity and provides the greatest assurance to a trial court as it at-
tempts the difficult task of balancing the state's interest in the protec-
tion of child witnesses and the defendant's right of confrontation.
The Alaska statute does not explicitly require that the child's in-
ability to testify effectively be attributable solely to the presence of the
defendant. In fact, the statute's reference to the child's inability to
effectively communicate "under normal court procedures" 85 might
suggest that the court should consider trauma created by exposure to
the courtroom setting. The phrase "under normal court procedures,"
however, also suggests consideration of the trauma created by the
presence of the defendant, for it is "normal" for the defendant to be
present. The interpretation least likely to run afoul of the confronta-
tion clause is one which considers the child's inability to communicate
solely on the basis of the trauma created by the presence of the
defendant.
The trial court in State v. Blume relied in large part on the disrup-
tive effect of the presence of the defendants on the child witness.86
While the record in Blume is not entirely clear, the trial court appears,
however, to have also based its findings in part on consideration of
anxiety created by the circumstances. 87 Furthermore, while the court
recognized that trauma would likely be inflicted on the child, 88 the
83. Id. § 12.45.046(a)(2).
84. State v. Vincent, 159 Ariz. 418, 432, 768 P.2d 150, 164 (1989); State v. Bon-
nello, 210 Conn. 51, 58, 59, 554 A.2d 277, 281, cert. denied, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct 2103
(1989); State v. Jarzbek, 210 Conn. 396, 397, 554 A.2d 1094, 1095 (1989); Craig v.
State, 316 Md. 551, 564, 560 A.2d 1120, 1126 (1989), cert. grantedsub nom. Maryland
v. Craig, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 834 (1990); State v. Conklin, 444 N.W.2d 268, 274
(Minn. 1989); State v. Davidson, 764 S.W.2d 731, 733-34 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); State
v. Crandall, 231 N.J. Super. 124, 131, 555 A.2d 35, 39 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989).
85. ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.046(a) (Supp. 1989).
86. Blume, transcript at 237-38, 277.
87. Id. at 236.
88. Id. at 277.
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expert testified only that the child "might tend to defer to [the defend-
ants] in some way."89 To the extent that the court relied on trauma
generated by sources other than the defendants, and to the extent that
trauma may not have resulted in the child's inability to communicate
effectively, the court's placement of the defendants behind a one-way
mirror in Blume may have offended the confrontation clause.
Where the child is intimidated by the courtroom itself, a cautious
court should seek to employ procedural alternatives which do not
compromise the defendant's right of confrontation. The Alaska stat-
ute allows the trial court to accommodate the child witness by making
the courtroom less intimidating to the child in situations in which the
court does not find that the child witness will be unable to testify effec-
tively. 90 A court should rely on these less intrusive remedies where
the threshold determination is not based solely on the trauma created
by the presence of the defendant.
C. Evidentiary Standard
The standard by which a trial court is to make its determination
that a case warrants protective procedures varies by jurisdiction.
While a number of states have not yet established an evidentiary stan-
dard, most state courts that have considered the question have ruled
that the finding of trauma must be established by "clear and convinc-
ing evidence." 91 In contrast, one state by statute requires only that the
finding of trauma be made by a "preponderance of the evidence." '92
One state by judicial decision has suggested that the state may need to
show "beyond a reasonable doubt" that protective procedures are nec-
essary to prevent severe, long-term emotional trauma to the child.93
Alaska has not yet considered the appropriate standard to be
used. The intermediate standard of "clear and convincing evidence"
accommodates both the Court's emphasis on necessity in this context
and the recognition that psychological determinations of prospective
trauma may often be incapable of estimation "beyond a reasonable
doubt." Alaska should therefore adopt the clear and convincing evi-
dence standard.
89. Id. at 236.
90. For a description of potential accommodations, see supra note 16.
91. State v. Bonello, 210 Conn. 51, 67,554 A.2d 277, 285, cert. denied, - U.S. --
109 S. Ct. 2103 (1989); State v. Eaton, 244 Kan. 370, -, 769 P.2d 1157, 1167-68
(1989); State v. Crandall, 231 N.J. Super. 124, 130-31, 555 A.2d 35, 39 (Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1989); State v. Taylor, 562 A.2d 445, 453 (R.I. 1989).
92. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 517:13-a (Supp. 1989).
93. Commonwealth v. Bergstrom, 402 Mass. 534, 550-51, 524 N.E.2d 366, 376
(1988) (basing its holding solely on its construction of the confrontation clause of the
Massachusetts Constitution).
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D. Basis for Determination
A final issue in construction of child witness protection statutes is
the evidence on which a court may permissibly base its constitution-
ally required finding that protective procedures are necessary to fur-
ther the state's important public policies. The Minnesota Supreme
Court has recommended that the finding be based on consideration of
several sources of information:
The trial judge is permitted, if not encouraged, to question the child
witness in camera if necessary. Additional testimony should be
taken from witnesses having personal knowledge of the child. Their
testimony must be about the consequences of having the child tes-
tify in the presence of the defendant, must be specific, and must be
based on their experience with that particular child. This pertains
to expert testimony as well. While expert testimony is not required
in every case, it may be necessary in cases where the cause of the
child's testimonial difficulties and trauma is not clear.94
Minnesota therefore advises the judge to consider his own questioning
of the child witness and lay and expert testimony about the likely ef-
fects of the presence of the defendant on the child. The Minnesota
procedure does not require that the child initially confront the defend-
ant before the judge may make this determination. 95
The trial court in State v. Blume considered both the circum-
stances of the case and expert testimony as to the likely effect of con-
frontation on the child witness.96 The court did not require that the
child initially confront the defendant in making its determination. 97
In contrast, the highest court of Maryland has recently held that
the Maryland statute may not ordinarily be invoked unless the child
witness is initially questioned in the presence of the defendant,
whether in or outside of the courtroom. 98 The trial judge may support
his finding with expert testimony, but expert testimony may not nor-
mally take the place of examination of the child in the presence of the
defendant. 99
The Maryland procedure is undesirable because it drastically un-
dercuts the policy sought to be advanced by the state: the protection
of child witnesses resulting from confrontation with the defendant. In
essence, the Maryland court construes too restrictively the Supreme
Court's requirement of necessity before protective procedures may be
invoked.
94. State v. Conklin, 444 N.W.2d 268, 274 (Minn. 1989).
95. See id.
96. Blume, transcript at 275-77.
97. See id.
98. Craig v. State, 316 Md. 551, 566-67, 560 A.2d 1120, 1127-28 (1989), cert.
granted sub nora. Maryland v. Craig, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 834 (1990).
99. Id.
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VI. THE ISSUES PRESENTED BY MARYLAND V CRAIG
On January 16, 1990, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to hear the case of Maryland v. Craig. 100 The Court will
consider for the first time the constitutionality of a child witness pro-
tection statute similar to the Alaska statute, which requires individual-
ized showings of necessity.
Under the Maryland statute0 1 protective procedures may be in-
voked when "the judge determines that testimony by the child victim
in the courtroom will result in the child suffering serious emotional
distress such that the child cannot reasonably communicate." 10 2 Ap-
plying this standard, the trial judge in Craig found the use of closed
circuit television necessary for four children whose ages ranged from
four to seven. He based his finding on expert testimony concerning
the ability of the children to communicate effectively.103 The defend-
ant was convicted under this procedure.o4
The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed the conviction of the
defendant and remanded for a new trial. The court rejected the trial
court's findings because the trial judge did not question the child him-
self, he did not observe the child in the presence of the defendant, he
did not consider alternatives less intrusive to the defendant's right of
confrontation, and he relied on expert testimony which did not dis-
criminate between trauma created by the courtroom experience and
trauma created by the presence of the defendant.10 5 The court held
that only trauma created by the defendant was sufficient to warrant
the use of closed circuit television outside the presence of the
defendant. 106
The Maryland high court mandated an exceptionally strong
showing of necessity, most notably in its requirement of an initial con-
frontation between the defendant and the child, a requirement the ma-
jority of courts have not imposed.10 7 The Maryland position may
100. - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 834 (1990).
101. MD. CrS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102 (1989).
102. Id. § 9-102(a)(1)(ii).
103. Craig, 316 Md. at 568, 560 A.2d at 1128.
104. Id. at 556, 560 A.2d at 1122.
105. Id. at 568, 560 A.2d at 1128. The expert testified, for instance, that as to one
child, "coming into the courtroom where she would be faced with the alleged perpe-
trator and a courtroom of strangers [she] would be unable to talk about what happened
to her." As to another, the expert concluded that "he would have great difficulty in
talking in front ofpeople, particularly in front of Mrs. Craig [the defendant] ..... " Id.
at 569, 560 A.2d at 1129 (emphasis in original).
106. Id. at 570, 560 A.2d at 1129.
107. See State v. Vincent, 159 Ariz. 418, 768 P.2d 150 (1989) (en banc); People v.
Thomas, 770 P.2d 1324 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988), cert. granted (Colo. Mar. 13, 1989);
State v. Bonello, 210 Conn. 51, 554 A.2d 277, cert. denied, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 2103
(1989); Glendening v. State, 536 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 109 S.
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approximate the position of Justice Scalia, given the importance he
attributed to the core right of confrontation in Coy, his refusal to iden-
tify exceptions to this core right and the value he perceived in the
capacity of face-to-face confrontation to ensure "the integrity of the
factfinding process."108 The Maryland position may create a more de-
manding standard of necessity than would Justice O'Connor, in light
of her expressed concern for the protection of child witnesses, her un-
willingness to embrace Justice Scalia's conception of the core nature of
the face-to-face confrontation right at issue and her general willingness
to admit that exceptions to the right of confrontation exist in this con-
text.109 The Maryland position is certainly more onerous than that of
the two dissenting Justices, who would not even require that an indi-
vidualized showing of necessity be made. 10
The degree of necessity required in Craig, while it might arguably
approximate the one drawn by Justice Scalia in Coy, is overly demand-
ing because it too heavily favors the defendant at the expense of the
child. Justice Scalia's opinion in Coy implicitly requires a strong
showing of necessity before protective procedures may be used, assum-
ing that Justice Scalia would in fact find that such procedures may be
invoked in certain circumstances. The balance he strikes is in part a
function of the degree to which he believes face-to-face confrontation
benefits the criminal defendant. Because this confrontation is not cost-
free, exacting a price both in terms of its psychological harm to the
child and its potential to so traumatize the child witness as to result in
the loss of truthful testimony, a court must weigh these competing
objectives. 'his balance will depend in part on the court's belief in the
accuracy and truthfulness of child witnesses, and the court's belief in
the ability of the trier of fact to detect lying by child witnesses absent
confrontation.
Ct. 3219 (1989); Brady v. State, 540 N.E.2d 59 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989); State v. Hover-
sten, 437 N.W.2d 240 (Iowa), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 212 (1989); State v.
Eaton, 244 Kan. 370, 769 P.2d 1157 (1989); Wildermuth v. State, 310 Md. 496, 530
A.2d 275 (1987); State v. Conklin, 444 N.W.2d 268 (Minn. 1989); State v. Crandall,
231 N.J. Super. 124, 555 A.2d 35 (Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. granted, 117 N.J. 143,
564 A.2d 866 (1989); State v. Tafoya, 108 N.M. 1, 765 P.2d 1183 (Ct. App. 1988),
cert. denied, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 1572 (1989); People v. Rivera, 141 Misc. 2d 1031,
535 N.Y.S.2d 909 (Sup. Ct. 1988); Ohio v. Eastham, 39 Ohio St. 3d 307, 530 N.E.2d
409 (1988); Commonwealth v. Groff, 548 A.2d 1237 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988); State v.
Thomas, 150 Wis. 2d 374, 442 N.W.2d 10, cert. denied, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 188
(1989). But see State v. Taylor, 562 A.2d 445, 453 (R.I. 1989) (interpreting the con-
frontation clause of the Rhode Island Constitution).
108. See Co, - U.S. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2800-03.
109. See id. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2803-05 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
110. See id. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2809 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Empirical evidence suggests that young children rarely fabricate
accounts of child abuse or child sexual abuse. 1 One commentator
has expressed concern over the suggestiveness of pretrial investigative
techniques in sexual abuse cases, such as the use of anatomically cor-
rect dolls, which may "stimulate fantasy and not recall. ' 112 In these
cases, however, courts have recognized that the frequent ability of vic-
tims of sexual abuse to testify accurately as to matters of sexuality not
ordinarily understood by children of their age and experience is one
guarantee of reliability.11 3
From a premise that young children will generally testify truth-
fully, it follows that the integrity of the factfinding process will be en-
hanced by abridging the defendant's right of face-to-face confrontation
where that confrontation will result in the child's inability to commu-
nicate. Statutes requiring a showing of inability to communicate will
thus contribute to more accurate truthfinding. This fact is not disposi-
tive, because our system of justice decisively favors the defendant in
criminal proceedings. To the extent, however, that Justice Scalia may
overvalue the need for physical confrontation to expose the untruthful
witness, the concerns for the welfare of the truthful witness and for the
state's interest in eliciting this testimony should be accorded more
weight than apparently given them by Justice Scalia in his opinion in
Coy. Similarly, the balance struck by Maryland in Craig, requiring an
initial face-to-face confrontation between the defendant and the child
before protective measures may be used, is inappropriate because it
overvalues the utility of that confrontation in determining the truth
and undervalues society's interest in protecting the welfare of the child
witness.
Justice Scalia also predicated his rigorous requirement of neces-
sity in Coy on his conception of the right of face-to-face confrontation
at trial as the core right of the confrontation clause." 4 His elevation
of this right above those rights implicit in the clause, such as the right
to cross-examine an accuser and the right to exclude certain out-of-
111. See Note, Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: A Spectrum
of Uses, 68 B.U.L. REV. 155, 175-76 (1988); Comment, Child Witnesses in Sexual
Abuse Proceedings: Their Capabilities, Special Problems, and Proposals for Reform, 13
PEPPERDINE L. REV. 157, 158-60 (1985) (suggesting that child witnesses are generally
as reliable as adults). See generally Myers, supra note 51, at 186-92 (considering both
the veracity and suggestibility of children).
112. See Christiansen, The Testimony of Child Witnesses: Fact, Fantasy, and the
Influence of Pretrial Interviews, 62 WASH. L. REV. 705, 711 (1987).
113. E.g., United States v. Dorian, 803 F.2d 1439, 1445 (8th Cir. 1986) (consider-
ing the reliability of hearsay statements by a child); State v. McCafferty, 356 N.W.2d
159, 164 (S.D. 1984), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1172 (1986).
114. Coy v. Iowa, - U.S. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2802-03.
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court statements, was not embraced by four members of the Court. I5
Justice Scalia's conception of the right to face-to-face confrontation at
trial as the "irreducible literal meaning of the clause" 1" 6 is concep-
tually unsatisfying because it is an overly formalistic reading of the
clause.
Justice Scalia rejected the contention that the Court had ever
identified exceptions to the core right of face-to-face confrontation at
trial.' 17 The exceptions the Court has recognized to the rights implicit
in the clause, however, such as exceptions to the right to exclude out-
of-court statements, necessarily implicate the core right identified by
Justice Scalia. 118 When, for example, hearsay evidence is admitted,
the defendant is denied his "core" right to face-to-face confrontation,
and yet the Court has not hesitated to allow such evidence in a variety
of situations.
The Court articulated the standard by which out-of-court state-
ments may be admitted in Ohio v. Roberts. 119 Despite Justice Scalia's
conception of the core right of confrontation as qualitatively different
from the implicit right to exclude certain out-of-court statements,
courts have often applied the functional equivalent of the Roberts test
of unavailability in determining whether procedural protection is nec-
essary for the protection of the child and for the production of child
witness testimony. 120
The Court in Roberts required that for an out-of-court statement
to be admitted which is not itself a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception,
the proponent must demonstrate that the witness is unavailable and
that the statement has independent guarantees of trustworthiness.' 21
As applied in the context of child witnesses, "unavailability" is mea-
sured by the inability of the child witness to testify effectively in the
presence of the defendant. 122 The requirement of reliability is gener-
ally held to be satisfied by the circumstances under which the child's
115. Id. at -- , 108 S. Ct. at 2804-05 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at--, 108 S. Ct.
at 2806 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at -- , 108 S. Ct. at 2803.
117. Id. at -- , 108 S. Ct. at 2802.
118. See, e.g, State v. Eaton, 244 Kan. 370, -, 769 P.2d 1157, 1166 (1989).
119. 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
120. See, e.g, State v. Vincent, 159 Ariz. 418, 432, 768 P.2d 150, 164 (1989) (a
finding that a child would be so traumatized as to be unable to communicate reason-
ably held "tantamount to a finding of unavailability in the Roberts sense") (quoting
Wildermuth v. State, 310 Md. 496, 519, 530 A.2d 275, 286 (1987)); State v. Eaton, 244
Kan. 370, -, "769 P.2d 1157, 1166 (1989).
121. 448 U.S. at 66.
122. E.g., Wildermuth v. State, 310 Md. 496, 514-16, 530 A.2d 275, 284-85 (1987).
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testimony is taken under the protective procedures: under oath, sub-
ject to cross-examination and in the view of the trier of fact who may
judge the demeanor of the witness as he or she testifies. 123
By adopting the conceptual framework of Roberts, courts have
implicitly rejected any substantive distinction between the core right of
face-to-face confrontation at trial and those rights which are implicit
in the clause. Because Justice Scalia attributed preeminent signifi-
cance to the "irreducible literal meaning of the clause," 124he required
too great a showing by the state before an exception to this literal
meaning could be identified. Justice Scalia's opinion in Coy should
therefore not be read to impose a burden as onerous as the Maryland
high court has imposed, requiring an initial confrontation between the
defendant and the child before protective procedures may be invoked.
The more desirable approach, that taken by the vast majority of states
and the trial court in Blume, is to allow an individual showing of ne-
cessity to be made absent an initial confrontation between the defend-
ant and the child.
The Craig case will present the Court with its first opportunity to
address the constitutionality of a child witness protection statute
which, like Alaska's, requires individualized showings of necessity.
While it seems clear that the Court will uphold the statute as constitu-
tional on its face, clarification is strongly needed as to the permissible
contours of the protective statute. Courts have been given little gui-
dance in construing their state's statute in harmony with the require-
ments of the right of confrontation as identified in Coy. Uncertainty
may prompt courts to require more than is necessary at the expense of
the interests of the state. As a practical matter, uncertainty may also
have a chilling effect on efforts to invoke protective procedures by de-
terring prosecutors and guardians ad litem, fearful of appellate court
reversal, from making use of protective statutes where arguably they
should. This chilling effect may be particularly strong in the case of
child witnesses because of the severe consequences that may flow from
appellate court reversal. Several years may pass between the alleged
incidents and the time of trial, and even more years may pass as the
defendant appeals his conviction. Where an appellate court rules that
the defendant is entitled to a new trial because of an infringement of
his right of confrontation, the child may be subjected to the trauma of
a second trial. The state may be unable to successfully prosecute the
defendant because the child may be unable to recall events which oc-
curred years before. The parties or the judge may therefore be reluc-
tant to protect the child at the initial trial, to the detriment of the
123. Id.
124. Coy, - U.S. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2803.
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child. An explicit pronouncement by the Court would reduce uncer-
tainty and eliminate the potential for uncertainty to produce a chilling
effect.
The Court's decision in Craig will almost certainly provide
greater guidance to the states as to what the confrontation clause re-
quires. Because of the demanding requirement of necessity mandated
by the Craig court, it appears likely that the Court will uphold the
constitutionality of the Maryland scheme, but the decision is difficult
to predict with precision. To the extent that the Maryland court was
improperly construing the sixth amendment, the Court may overturn
the decision. To the extent that the Maryland court was construing
Maryland law, the Court may defer to its interpretation. The decision
could have a profound impact on the manner in which courts in every
state interpret their child witness protection statutes. The decision in
Craig will be particularly instructive as Alaska courts undertake to
construe the Alaska statute.
VII. CONCLUSION
Alaska's child witness protection statute attempts to protect chil-
dren who testify from the trauma associated with confronting the de-
fendant in court. The statute as drafted does not impermissibly
compromise the defendant's right of confrontation as secured by the
sixth amendment. Careful construction of the statute by the Alaska
courts will shield the statute from constitutional challenge. The
United States Supreme Court, in its upcoming decision in Maryland v.
Craig, will likely assist Alaska courts in determining the appropriate
scope of the Alaska statute.
James S. Rowe
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